Non-malleable codes provide a useful and meaningful security guarantee in situations where traditional errorcorrection (and even error-detection) is impossible; for example, when the attacker can completely overwrite the encoded message. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the message contained in a modified codeword is either the original message, or a completely unrelated value. Although such codes do not exist if the family of "tampering functions" F is completely unrestricted, they are known to exist for many broad tampering families F . One such natural family is the family of tampering functions in the so called split-state model. Here the message m is encoded into two shares L and R , and the attacker is allowed to arbitrarily tamper with L and R individually. The split-state tampering arises in many realistic applications, such as the design of non-malleable secret sharing schemes, motivating the question of designing efficient non-malleable codes in this model.
INTRODUCTION
The problem of reliable storage/transmission of information is one of the oldest and fundamental problems of information theory. The basic problem can be abstracted as the question of designing an efficient way to encode/decode the message m , so that the resulted codeword c = Enc(m) is "resilient" against some natural class of error or tampering functions F . In more detail, one can imagine the attacker can choose an arbitrary (unknown) tampering function f ∈ F and modify the real codeword c into a corrupted codeword c = f (c) , and the goal of a good coding scheme (Enc, Dec) is to protect against such tampering attacks. Depending on the richness of the tampering class F , one can demand various security guarantees from such an encoding.
Error-Correcting Codes.
The most desirable such guarantee would be error-correction, which demands that m can be correctly recovered (possibly, with high probability) from c . This has led to the rich theory of error-correcting codes, which provide such error-correction for the natural family of functions F which flip some (small) subset of the bits (or symbols) of the encoding. Still, as useful and natural error-correcting codes are, in some situations the tampering function f ∈ F might either exceed the maximum number of errors for reliable error-correction, or might even touch the entire codeword in some natural yet restricted way (see below). In such settings one must relax the notion of errorcorrection to some meaningful weaker notion.
Error-Detecting Codes.
One such notion is errordetection, which guarantees that the decoding of the corrupted codeword c = f (c) will almost never output some message m = m , but is allowed to output a special symbol ⊥ when it detects some tampering which cannot be corrected reliably. For example, any (deterministic) code capable of correcting d Hamming errors much be able to reliably detect at least 2d errors. More interestingly, error-detecting codes allow one to possibly handle useful tampering classes F where there is no hope for meaningful error-correction.
One such class of tampering functions was considered by Cramer et al. [8] and consists of all functions f∆(c) = c + ∆ which add a fixed offset ∆ to the codeword c in some appropriate group (e.g., such a function can flip every bit c when addition is ⊕ ). Notice, error-correction is indeed impossible here, since the attacker can simply choose a random offset ∆ to completely erase any information about the original message m . More interestingly, although this class might seem somewhat artificial at the first glance, the authors showed that developing error-detecting codes -which they called algebraic-manipulation detection (AMD) codes -for this class has useful applications to the design of so called robust secret sharing schemes and robust fuzzy extractors [2, 11] . Finally, unlike error-correction codes, which can be deterministic, AMD codes must be probabilistic, since otherwise the attacker can set ∆ = c2 − c1 for two valid codewords c1 and c2 .
Non-malleable Codes.
Unfortunately, even errordetecting codes are rather limited in some situations, since they cannot protect a natural tampering function f (c) which simply overwrites the codeword c by another fixed (and valid) codeword c * . This basic attack is quite natural both in the message transmission scenario (where the channel might simply block the original encoded message, and send a different message instead), and in the secure storage scenario (where the attacker might be able to format the hard-drive, for example). Until recently, it was believed that handling such "constant" tampering functions is impossible without having any secrets, and using tools from cryptography (such as signatures or message authentication codes) is essential for preventing more general tampering attacks. Fortunately, Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [16] recently showed that this belief is overly pessimistic, and introduced a natural and beautiful relaxation of error-detecting codes which they called non-malleable codes (with respect to a given family F ). Intuitively, such a non-malleable code ensures that the decoded message m = Dec(f (Enc(m))) is either (a) equal to m (tampering corrected); or (b) equal to ⊥ (tampering detected); or (c) completely "unrelated" to the original message m .
1 Moreover, one can figure out which of the scenarios (a)-(c) happens by just looking at the function f (independent of the original message m , to ensure that the choice of the tampering (a)-(c) is not correlated with the message m ). In other words, non-malleable codes aim to handle a much larger class of tampering functions F at the expense of potentially allowing the attacker to replace a given message m by an unrelated message m (and also necessarily allowing for a small "simulation error" ε ).
The authors [16] also showed that non-malleable codes are still useful in many scenarios where the tampering capabilities of the attacker might be too strong for error-detection. For example, imagine a tamper-prone signature card storing a signing key sk and some "context information" α (e.g., the timestamp or some legal disclosure), which will return a signature σ of (α, β) when given an input message β . Imagine now the attacker would like to change α (that he knows) to some related value α = α , in the hope of obtaining an "illegal" signature of (α , β) . If m = (sk, α) is encoded using a non-malleable code, then we are guaranteed that the sig-nature σ obtained by the attacker will either contain the correct value of α , or will not verify anyway, since changing α to α will also force the attacker to change the signing key sk to a completely unrelated value sk , making the resulting signature σ (under sk ) "useless".
Split-State Model. Given the elegance and utility of non-malleable codes, it is natural to understand the tampering families F for which such codes exist. As the first observation, we cannot hope to include all possible tampering functions, since F should not include "re-encoding functions" f (c) = Enc(f (Dec(c))) for any non-trivial function f (as m = Dec(f (c)) = f (m) is obviously related to m ). On the other hand, [16] showed the following positive results. First, they showed a very promising (and surprising!) existence result for any family F which is only slightly smaller than the family F all of all functions. Second, they showed an efficient non-malleable code for the family F bit of "individual" bit-tampering functions f . Although pretty restricted, F bit includes all constant functions f (c) = c * (something which cannot be error-detected), and all algebraic manipulation functions f (c) = c + ∆ mentioned earlier.
This raises the question of finding a much larger family F which is (1) general and realistic from the application point of view; but (2) naturally does not include the reencoding function to avoid the impossibility. The authors [16] propose to solve this dilemma in the following very elegant way, by defining the so called split-state model. The model was originally proposed in the context of leakageresilient cryptography [15, 9] , but it also very natural from the perspective of tampering. Imagine that the encoded memory/state of the system is partitioned in several disjoint parts P1, . . . , Pt , and the family Ft of tampering functions consists of all functions f = (f1, . . . , ft) where fi is only applied to the data stored in the partition Pi . To put it differently, the message m is split into t shares s1, . . . , st , and the attacker can arbitrarily tamper with each share independently 2 by changing it to s i = fi(si) . Still, the decoded message m = Dec(s 1 , . . . , s t ) is either equal to m , ⊥ or unrelated to m (as explained above).
As we can see, split-state tampering is very natural from the application point of view, especially when t is low and the shares s1, . . . , st are stored in different parts of memory, or by different parties. Indeed, a non-malleable code w.r.t. Ft can be viewed as a type of non-malleable secret sharing scheme. Recall, in traditional secret sharing schemes one primarily worries about the privacy of the secret m against a certain bounded coalition of shares si (which clearly cannot include all the t shares). Robust secret sharing schemes, considered by [8] (which used the AMD codes mentioned earlier), additionally ensure than a bounded coalition of players cannot maliciously modify their shares and cause the reconstruction of some secret m = m . Once again, the coalition cannot include all t players. In contrast, a non-malleable secret sharing scheme, induced by a non-malleable code in the split-state model, provides the non-malleability of the secret m (as explained above) even if all t shares are individually modified, something which was never previously considered possible/meaningful in the secret sharing literature.
Coming back to the split-state model, it also overcomes the impossibility result mentioned earlier, since the decoding function will depend on all the shares s1, . . . , st (something which is not allowed by the tampering function f ). Moreover, since Ft is indeed noticeably smaller than F all for t > 1 , we know that non-malleable codes exist in the split-state model. In fact, the bit-wise tampering family F bit mentioned above can be viewed as an extreme setting of the split-state model, where each share si is only 1 bit (making it rather unrealistic for applications). In particular, it is clear that as t decreases, the tampering family Ft becomes larger and larger (i.e., more realistic!), and the problem of building non-malleable codes w.r.t. Ft correspondingly becomes harder and harder, becoming the hardest when t = 2 . Hence, from now on we will concentrate on the most useful/ambitious case of only two partitions/shares ("left" and "right"), which we will denote by L and R in the sequel. Summarizing the above discussion, this leads us to the main question of this work:
Main Question: Build an efficient non-malleable code in the (two-partition) split-state model.
Known Results. As we mentioned, this question is not new, and several partial results were known prior to our work. First, we already mentioned the existential result of [16] showing the existence of such non-malleable codes. Second, the work of [16] also gave an efficient construction in the random oracle model. Third, the work of Liu and Lysyanskaya [26] built an efficient computationally-secure non-malleable code in the split model (necessarily restricting the tampering functions f1 and f2 to be efficient as well). The construction assumes so called common reference string (CRS) which cannot be tampered, and also uses quite heavy tools from public-key cryptography, such as robust noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs [10] and leakage-resilient encryption [27] . Thus, given the clean information-theoretic definition of non-malleable codes, we believe it is important to construct such codes unconditionally.
Recently, an important step in this direction was taken by Dziembowski, Kazana and Obremski [14] , who constructed a very elegant non-malleable code for 1 -bit messages in the split-state model. Their construction is very simple. Both shares L and R lie in an n -dimensional vector space F n (for a large enough finite field F , and of exponential-size). To encode 0 , one chooses a random pair of orthogonal vectors L and R ( L, R = 0 ), and to encode 1 one chooses a random pair of non-orthogonal vectors L and R ( L, R = 0 ). Despite the simplicity of this construction, the security proof given by [14] was quite involved, and introduced several novel techniques, such as characterizing a given tampering function f1 or f2 as being "close" or "far" from a constant. Unfortunately, given the asymmetric nature of their construction (i.e., encodings of 0 and 1 are very different) and several other "bit-specific" proof techniques they use, 3 it is unclear how to extend the proof (or even construction!) to the much more useful case of encoding longer than 1 bit messages.
To summarize, despite lots of partial progress, the question of constructing efficient, information-theoretically secure non-malleable codes for long messages was still open prior to our work. ) ) information-theoretically secure ε -nonmalleable code for encoding k -bit messages in the (twopartition) split-state model.
As we discuss below, our code is very simple and efficient relative to the length N of the shares L and R (i.e., given N , our encoding and decoding are both very simple). On the other hand, the minimal length N = poly(k, log(1/ε)) which is sufficient for our security proof is governed by the current state-of-the-art in additive combinatorics. We discuss this in more detail below and in Section 7, here only mentioning that the current provable bound is N =Õ((k + log(1/ε)) 7 ) (which is very likely sub-optimal).
Our code is constructed in two steps. The first (and much simpler) step constructs a non-malleable code (Enc , Dec ) for an intermediate tampering family F aff consisting of all affine functions f (y) = ay + b over some (sufficiently large) finite field Fp of prime order, where a, b ∈ Fp are arbitrary constants. Notice, such Fp -affine family is rather natural and again includes all constant functions (corresponding to a = 0 ), as well as all algebraic manipulation functions (corresponding to a = 1 ), potentially making our intermediate non-mallable code interesting in its own right. The actual code over the message space M is constructed by building what we call an affine-evasive function h : Fp → M ∪ {⊥} . Informally, such functions not only send most field elements u to ⊥ , but also guarantee that h(au + b) = ⊥ with high probability even conditioned on h(u) = m , for any message m and a, b where (a, b) = (1, 0) and a = 0 (i,e., excluding the trivial identity and constant functions, respectively). As a result, the non-malleable code for F aff easily follows by setting Dec = h . Moreover, we give a construction of such affine-evasive functions h .
The second (and more involved) step can be seen as reducing the task of building a non-malleable code for the split-state model to the non-malleable code for the Fpaffine function. In particular, we simply use the inner product function over the n -dimensional vector space F n p (for a large enough n , discussed below) as our reduction. A bit more formally, Enc(m) first computes the intermediate encoding y ← Enc (m) for the affine family above, and then picks random shares L and R whose inner product is y : L, R = y . Thus, our construction is similar in spirit to the 1 -bit construction of [14] , except we treat all messages in a symmetric manner, and ensure that a random pair (L, R) decodes to ⊥ with high probability. We then show the soundness of our reduction from the split-state model to the Fp -affine model, by showing the following key theorem about the "non-malleability" of the inner product function:
Fp is a finite field of prime order, n ≥ poly(log p)) , L and R are uniformly random over F n p , and f, g : F n p → F n p are two arbitrary functions on L and R . Then, the joint distribution ( L, R , f (L), g(R) ) is "close" to the convex combination of affine distributions {(U, aU + b) | a, b ∈ Fp} , where U is uniformly random over Fp .
The formal statement appears in Theorem 3. Intuitively, though, the above result shows that the inner product function effectively maps the (seemingly) very powerful split-state tampering (given by arbitrary functions f and g ) to a convex combination of much more basic affine functions ay + b (which, in turn, are protected by our "inner" non-malleble code). Not surprisingly, the proof of Theorem 2 (or, more accurately, Theorem 3) forms the main technical contribution of our work, and may be of independent interest. It is detailed in Section 5, but crucially relies on Theorem 6, which in turn relies on several results from additive combinatorics. Theorem 6 can be seen as an improvement of the linearity test of [28] for functions f : F n p → F n p . The key ingredient resulting in this improvement is the so called the Quasi-polynomial FreimanRuzsa Theorem, which was recently established by Sanders [29] as a step towards resolving the Polynomial FreimanRuzsa conjecture [21] . We refer to Section 5.3 and Section 6 for more details on specific parameters and how they are used to establish Theorem 3, but mention that the (likely) sub-optimality of Sander's result is the main reason for a relatively large dimension n ≈ log 6 p =Õ((k + log(1/ε)) 6 ) of the vector space F n p for our non-malleable encoding of k -bit messages, which leads to an even larger encoding length N = n log p =Õ((k + log(1/ε)) 7 ) . In fact, under the standard PFR conjecture, our construction is secure for N =Õ((k + log(1/ε))
2 ) , and we conjecture that it might even be secure when n = O(1) , which would lead to almost constant-rate N =Õ(k + log(1/ε)) . We refer to the "Conclusions" Section 7 for more discussion of the parameters.
Other Related Work.
In addition to the alreadymentioned results of [16, 26, 14] , several recent works [3, 4, 7] either used or built various non-malleable codes, but none concentrated on the split-state model considered here.
The notion of non-malleability was introduced by the seminal paper of Dolev, Dwork and Naor [13] , and has found many applications in cryptography. Traditionally, non-malleability is defined in the computational setting, but recently non-malleability has been successfully defined and applied in the information-theoretic setting (generally resulting in somewhat simpler and cleaner definitions than their computational counter-parts). For example, in addition to non-malleable codes studied in this work, the work of Dodis and Wichs [12] defined the notion of non-malleable extractors as a tool for building round-efficient privacy amplification protocols.
Finally, the study of non-malleable codes falls into a much larger cryptographic framework of providing countermeasures against various classes of tampering attacks. This work was pioneered by the early works of [23, 19, 22] , and has since led to many subsequent models. Listing all such tampering models (which are not directly related to the study of non-malleable codes) is beyond the scope of this work, but we refer to [24, 26] for an excellent discussion of various such models.
Subsequent Work. Also, following our work, there has been several works on non-malleable codes [5, 6, 17, 18] . None of these works improved on the parameters achieved here in terms of explicit non-malleable codes in the splitstate model. However, Cheraghchi and Guruswami [6] defined a notion of non-malleable two-source extractors, and showed that a construction of non-malleable twosource extractors (which is still open) would imply nonmalleable codes against split-state adversaries. Additionally, Cheraghchi and Guruswami [5] showed that there exist (inefficient) non-malleable codes in the N -bit split-state model where N = k(1 + o(1)) . A convex combination of distributions D1, . . . , D k is any distribution D for which
PRELIMINARIES
for all x , where αi ≥ 0 and αi = 1 . The min-entropy of a distribution is
−1 ) . For a finite set S we denote by US the uniform distribution over S . By x ← S , we denote that x is chosen uniformly at random from S . Note that H∞(US) = log |S| . Moreover, if D is a distribution with min-entropy k then D is a convex combination of distributions uniform over sets of size 2 k . We denote random variables by X, L, R . Let E be an event. We denote by X|E the conditional random variable, conditioned on E holding. For a set S we shorthand X|S = X|[X ∈ S] . When there is no chance of confusion, we use interchangeably a random variable to denote also its underlying distribution.
Inequalities on distributions far from uniform.
We will need the following claims. Their proofs can be found in the full version. Claim 1. Let X = (X1, X2) ∈ Fp × Fp be a random variable. Assume that for all a, b ∈ Fp not both zero,
Claim 2. Let X ∈ Fp be a random variable. Assume that ∆(X ; UF p ) ≥ ε . Then if X is an independent and i.i.d copy of X then 
The Hadamard extractor.
The Hadamard extractor is one of the most basic twosource extractors, based on inner product. We would need the following folklore result. A proof can, for example, be found in [25] . Lemma 1. Let L and R be independent random variables over F n p . If
THE JOINT PROBABILITY DISTRIBU-TION OF ( L, R , F (L), G(R) )
Let Fp be a finite field of prime order. Let L, R ∈ F n p be uniform and independent. Let f, g : F n p → F n p be a pair of functions. We consider the following family of distributions
We characterize in this section the possible joint distributions of φ f,g (L, R) over F 2 p for arbitrary functions f, g . In order to build intuition, let us first consider a few of possible distributions achievable this way.
• f (L) = (a, 0, . . . , 0), g(R) = (1, 0, . . . , 0) for a ∈ Fp .
Then φ f,g (L, R) has a distribution that is statistically very close to (U, a) where U ∈ Fp is uniform.
• f (L) = aAL, g(R) = (A T ) −1 R for some a ∈ Fp , and invertible matrix A ∈ F n×n p . Then φ f,g (L, R) has a distribution that is statistically very close to (U, aU ) where X ∈ Fp is uniform.
In general, by choosing f, g as an arbitrary mix of the above, we can achieve nearly any convex combination of {(U, a) : a ∈ Fp} and {(U, aU ) : a ∈ Fp} , where U is uniform in Fp . For a large number of choices of f, g , these are the only possible distributions of φ f,g (L, R) . The following, however, shows an example of f, g for which φ f,g (L, R) has statistical distance about 1/p from any of these distributions.
•
is very close to being distributed as (U, U + XY ) where U, X, Y ∈ Fp are uniform and independent. Note that the distribution of XY is not uniform, as it is equal to zero with probability 2/p − 1/p 2 instead of 1/p .
We do not have a complete characterization of all possible distributions φ f,g (L, R) . However, our main technical result is that any such distribution is arbitrarily close to a convex combination of (U, aU + b) where a, b ∈ Fp if n is large enough. Define D to be the family of convex combinations of {(U, aU + b) : a, b ∈ Fp} where U ∈ Fp is uniform.
This will be sufficient to analyze our construction of nonmalleable codes.
Theorem 3. There exists absolute constants c, c > 0 such that the following holds. For any finite field Fp of prime order, and any n > c log 6 p , let L, R ∈ F n p be uniform, and fix f, g :
We give a proof of this theorem in Section 5.
NON-MALLEABLE CODES

Definitions.
We first recall the definition of non-malleable codes from [16] . Definition 1. A coding scheme consists of two functions: a randomized encoding function Enc : M → C , and a deterministic decoding function Dec : C → M ∪ {⊥} such that, for each m ∈ M , Pr(Dec(Enc(m)) = m) = 1 (over the randomness of the encoding algorithm).
Definition 2. Let F be some family of tampering functions. For each f ∈ F , and m ∈ M , define the tamperingexperiment
which is a random variable over the randomness of the encoding function Enc . We say that a coding scheme (Enc, Dec) is ε -non-malleable w.r.t. is at most ε . Additionally, D f should be efficiently samplable given oracle access to f (·) .
Our result.
For any ε > 0 , we give an encoding scheme from
Θ(log log(K/ε)) , and n = Θ(log 6 p) ) that is ε -non-malleable with respect to the family of all functions in the split state model, i.e., all functions (f, g) :
, where f and g are functions from F n p → F n p , and (f, g)(x, y) = (f (x), g(y)) , for all x, y ∈ F n p . Our construction proceeds as follows.
• In Section 4.1, we construct an encoding scheme from M to Fp that is non-malleable with respect to the class of all affine functions over Fp .
• In Section 4.2, we use Theorem 3 to argue that we can reduce the problem of constructing an encoding scheme from M to F n p × F n p that is non-malleable in the split state model to the problem of constructing an encoding scheme from M to Fp that is non-malleable with respect to the class of all affine functions over Fp . We then use the result of Section 4.1 to conclude the result.
For the subsequent sections, we denote by U a random variable distributed uniformly over Fp .
A non-malleable encoding scheme with respect to affine functions
In this section, we will construct an encoding scheme scheme from M = {1, . . . , K} to a finite field Fp of prime order p , where p = (
Θ(log log(K/ε)) that is ε -nonmalleable with respect to the family of affine functions F aff over Fp , i.e., 
Construction.
For our construction, we use affine-evasive functions, defined as follows: A surjective function h : Fp → M ∪ {⊥} is called (γ, δ) -affine-evasive if or any a, b ∈ Fp such that a = 0 , and (a, b) = (1, 0) , and for any m ∈ M ,
An affine-evasive function can be constructed from an affine-evasive set S ⊆ Fp defined below.
Definition 3. A non-empty set S ⊆ Fp is said to be (γ, ν) -affine-evasive if |S| ≤ γp , and for any (a, b) ∈ F 2 p \ {(1, 0)} , we have
We defer the construction of an affine-evasive set, and hence an affine-evasive function to the full version of the paper.
Let h : Fp → M ∪ {⊥} be a (γ, δ) -affine-evasive function. The scheme is defined using h as follows: The decoding function Dec : Fp → M ∪ {⊥} is defined as Dec(x) := h(x) . The encoding function is defined as Enc(m) = X where X is chosen at random from Fp conditioned on the fact that Dec(X) = m . The simulator is as follows.
Simulator.
For any function f ∈ F aff , we define the distribution D f over M∪{⊥, same * } as the output of the following (efficient) sampling procedure:
The security proof for this construction can be found in the full version of the paper. The final result we obtain is the following:
ρ log log(4K/ε) be a prime. Then the scheme ( Enc, Dec ) is ε -non malleable w.r.t. F aff . In particular, for any m ∈ M , any a, b ∈ Fp , ∆ Sim 
Non-malleable codes in the split-state model
Now we are in place to give an information-theoretically secure construction of non-malleable codes in the split-state model.
Construction.
We construct an ε -non-malleable encoding scheme from M = {1, . . . , K} to F 
The encoding function is defined as Enc
We will show that our scheme is ε -non-malleable with respect to the family of all functions (f, g) : . Let
The simulator for the security proof of our construction is as follows.
Simulator.
For any functions f, g : F n p → F n p , we define the distribution D f,g over M ∪ {⊥, same * } as the output of the following sampling procedure:
Note that this distribution is efficiently samplable given oracle access to f and g . The proof relies on Theorem 3 and can be found in the full version of the paper.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We recall Theorem 3 for the convenience of the reader, where D was defined to be the family of convex combinations of {(U, aU + b) : a, b ∈ Fp} where U ∈ Fp is uniform..
Theorem 3
There exists absolute constants c, c > 0 such that the following holds. For any finite field Fp of prime order, and any n > c log 6 p , let L, R ∈ F n p be uniform, and fix f, g :
. We prove Theorem 3 in this section. Let us fix functions f, g : F n p → F n p and shorthand φ(L, R) = φ f,g (L, R) . An important ingredient in the proof will be conditioning φ on various subsets of F n p × F n p . We will use the following notation: for set P ⊂ F n p × F n p let φ(L, R)|P denote the conditional distribution of φ(L, R) conditioned on (L, R) ∈ P . Equivalently, it is the distribution of φ(L, R) for uniformly chosen (L, R) ∈ P . We will typically be using this applied to product sets P = L × R for L, R ⊆ F n p . We start with the following simple lemma, showing that it suffices to prove Theorem 3 for partitions of the ambient space.
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from the definitions.
For
We next define a partition of F n p × F n p to which we will apply Lemma 2. Let s = n 10
, and t = , where c1 is some constant that will be chosen later. Note that s t . We choose the constant c in the statement of Theorem 3 such that t ≥ 3 .
We first define a partition L1, . . . , La of F n p based on f . Intuitively, Li for 1 ≤ i < a will correspond to inputs on which f agrees with a popular linear function; and La will be the remaining elements.
We define L1, . . . , La iteratively. We next define a parition based on g to elements whose output is too popular; and the rest. For y ∈ F n p let g −1 (y) = {x ∈ F n p : g(x) = y} be the set of pre-images of y . Define
and set R1 := F n p \ R0 . We define the following partition of
We will argue that for any part, either its probability is small, or the joint distribution of φ(L, R) conditioned on (L, R) belonging to it, is close to D . We then apply Lemma 2 to obtain a proof of Theorem 3.
g is close to constant
We first analyze the distribution conditioned on (L, R) ∈ F n p × R0 , that is on inputs x for which g(x) has many preimages.
We can decompose R0 as the disjoint union over y ∈ Y of g −1 (y) .
By Lemma 2 it suffices to prove the lemma conditioned on R ∈ g −1 (y) for all y ∈ Y . Fix such a y ∈ Y and let Ry = R| g(R)=y denote the conditional random variable. Since by assumption |g
where U ∈ Fp is uniform indepenent of L, Ry . In particular, noting that g(Ry) is always equal to y , we have that
This concludes the proof since (U, f (L), y ) is in the convex combination of {(U, a) : a ∈ Fp} which is contained in D .
f is close to linear
Proof. Let L ∈ Li, R ∈ R1 be uniform and independent. Note that
we are done since the uniform distribution is in D . If not, then by Claim 1 there exist a, b ∈ Fp , not both zero, such that
Now, by assumption, L is uniform over a set of size at least p n−s . Assume that H∞(aR + bA T g(R )) = k log p . Then, using Lemma 1 gives
This means that k ≤ 3s + 4 ≤ 4s . So, there exist y ∈ F n p and a subset R 1 ⊂ R1 of size |R 1 | ≥ |R1| · p −4s such that
We clearly cannot have b = 0 since ax = y can hold only for one value of x . So, as b = 0 we can rewrite (and rename the constants for convenience) as
Let R2 = R1 \ R 1 . We repeat this process with R1 replaced by R2 to get a set R 2 ⊂ R2 of size |R 2 | ≥ |R2| · p −4s and y2 ∈ F n p such that
We continue this process to get R3, . . . ,
. Consider the partition of Li × R1 as {Li × R 1 , . . . , Li × R b−1 , Li×R b } . We argue next that all the partitions, except for perhaps the last one, induce distributions very close to D .
Proof. Let L * ∈ Li and R * ∈ R j be independent and
where the last inequality follows from our assumption that n ≥ 10s . So ∆( L * , R * , f (L * ), g(R * ) ; U, ajU + X) ≤ p −s
where U ∈ Fp is uniform and X ∈ Fp is independent from U and distributed like L * , yj . As this distribution is in D this conclude the proof. 
f is far from linear and g is far from constant
The last partition we need to analyze is La × R1 , corresponding to the case where f is far from linear and g is far from constant. For this, we need the following result that can be seen as a generalization of the linearity test from [28] and that is discussed and proved in Section 6.
Theorem 6. Let p be a prime, and n ∈ N . For any ε = ε(n, p) > 0 , γ1 = γ1(n, p) ≤ 1 , γ2 = γ2(n, p) ≥ 1 , the following is true. For any function f : F We will now show that, φ(L, R)|L a ×R 1 is close to uniform over Fp × Fp . In particular,
Proof. Let L ∈ La, R ∈ R1 be uniform and independent. We assume that φ(L , R ) is not p −t -close to UF p ×Fp , as otherwise the result trivially holds. Then, by Claim 1 there exist a, b ∈ Fp , not both zero, so that ∆(a L , R + b f (L ), g(R ) ; UF p ) ≥ p −t−2 . Define functions F, G : F Let B ∈ B be uniform. Then ∆( B, G(R ) , UF p ) ≥ 1 p 2t+6 . Also, since g(y) has at most p t preimages for any y ∈ F n p , G(R ) has min-entropy at least log(|R1|p −t ) ≥ (n − 2t) log p . Hence, by Lemma 1, we have H∞(B) ≤ (n + 6t + 13) · log p , which implies |B| ≤ p n+6t+13 . Furthermore, we have that Conjecture 2. There exists absolute constants c, c > 0 such that the following holds. For any finite field Fp of prime order, and any n > c , let L, R ∈ F n p be uniform, and fix f, g : F n p → F n p . Then
We thus obtain the following corollary using our construction from Section 4.2.
Corollary 2. There exists an ε -non-malleable coding scheme against split-state adversaries from k -bit messages to two N -bit parts, where
• N =Θ((k + log(1/ε))
2 ) under the PFR conjecture.
• N = Θ((k + log(1/ε)) 2 ) under Conjecture 1 and the PFR conjecture.
• N =Θ(k + log(1/ε)) under Conjecture 2.
• N = Θ(k + log(1/ε)) under Conjecture 1 and 2.
